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Works by Strong, Charles A. (exact spelling)
10 found
Order:
- Consciousness and time.Charles A. Strong - 1896 - Psychological Review 3:149-57.
- A deterministic analysis of free will.Charles A. Strong - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (5):125-131.
- A Conversation, Partly Real and Partly Imaginary.Charles A. Strong - 2001 - Overheard in Seville 19 (19):31-33.
- A plea for substantialism in psychology.Charles A. Strong - 1934 - Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):309-328.
- Dr. munsterberg's theory of mind and body and its consequences.Charles A. Strong - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (2):179-195.
- Is perception direct, or representative?Charles A. Strong - 1931 - Mind 40 (158):217-220.
- The nature of consciousness III.Charles A. Strong - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (22):589-603.
- The nature of consciousness I.Charles A. Strong - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (20):533-544.
- The nature of consciousness II.Charles A. Strong - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (21):561-573.
- The sensori-motor theory of awareness.Charles A. Strong - 1939 - Journal of Philosophy 36 (15):393-405.
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